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Abstract 
Access to drinking water is a global agenda. The purpose of this study is to examine drinking water 
coordination mechanisms in the post 1990 Ethiopia and its impact on access to drinking water. To this end 
we analysed drinking water policies, strategies and plans, and relevant secondary sources using qualitative 
and quantitative methods. The study reveals that Ethiopia has been using a mix of NPM and Developmental 
State (DS) doctrine since 1991. Elements of NPM include emphasis on cost-recovery, private sector 
involvement and performance management while equitable and inclusive service delivery refer to 
democratic DS doctrine, but the balance between the two options has not equilibrated. Second, broadly the 
study discovers that access has improved and interregional inequalities and inequalities between rural-rural, 
urban-urban between regions were reduced overtime, even though the inequality was still significant. Third, 
the study ascertains  that there is decoupling between drinking water policy cycle, and a loose coupling 
between management and policy cycles at all levels. Fourth, the study finds two decentralization waves: a 
first one during the transitional government of Ethiopia (1991-1995), and a second that has started since the 
early 2000s. Fifth, the study reveals there is a new trend, starting in 2005 toward harmonization, integration 
and alignment under the leadership of Ethiopian government and systematic centralization of authority, but 
further decentralization of responsibility using predominately Hierarchical  type Mechanisms (HTM) albeit 
quasi Market type Mechanisms (MTM) and quasi Network type Mechanisms (NTM). NGOs, donors and 
private sectors were now systematically controlled, and in some regions the government recentralized 
authority of local governments. Thus, the paper argues that the post 2005 coordination approach, although 
has comparable net effect, is certainly different from the ongoing approaches to strengthen vertical and 
horizontal coordination in OECD countries. In general, the study implies that historically entrenched top 
down political culture may constrain the legitimacy of local government and opportunities for co-
production of drinking water supply. 
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Introduction  
Access to drinking water is an essential precondition for sustainable development: it 
contributes to the health of the population, allowing it participating to national 
development. This is widely recognized by the UN in its Millennium Development Goals 
framework and in its sixth Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2000, 2015), and by the 
African Union in its 2063 Agenda (African Union 2013). But in general ensuring access to 
drinking water is increasingly challenging as the population is growing; increasing 
urbanization, agriculture and industry, and other sectors all competing for water 
(Axworthy & Sandford, 2012; Pangare & Idris, 2012) and historically significant structural 
social inequalities (Castro & Heller, 2009).  
Ethiopia has recognized the importance of ensuring access to drinking water to 
improve the well being of society and socio-economic development. Political commitment 
is revealed in policy frameworks and plans (FDER, 1995, MoWR, 1999, 2006; MoWIE, 
2014; MoFED, 2005, 2010, MoWE, 2011, 2013), and in the subscription to the Millenium 
Development Goals (MDG) framework in 2000. The Ethiopian Growth and Transformation 
Plan (GTP) aims at 100% urban access to drinking water within 0.5 km and 98% rural 
access to drinking water coverage within 1.5 km by 2014-15 (MoFED, 2010).   
By drinking water, we mean water which is collected from protected sources for 
domestic purposes such as drinking, bathing and food preparation and that satisfies the 
minimum standard set by World Health Organization (WHO, 2004).  
The paper addresses three research questions. First, how have Ethiopian of water 
supply coordination mechanisms evolved since 1991? Second, has access to drinking 
water improved since 1991? Finally, can variations of performance be attributed to 
changes in coordination mechanisms? ? To answer these research questions, we rely on 
an analysis of policy documents and process, government data related to access to 
drinking water and academic literature.  
The paper unfolds as follows. The first section develops the theoretical framework 
that will be used to answer the first research question. The second section presents the 
research method. The third and the fourth sections deal with the evolutions and results of 
Ethiopian water policies respectively. The discussion section examines whether variations 
in access to drinking water can be attributed to policy changes.  
 
 
Theoretical framework: special ization and coordination 
Introduction 
Verhoest et al. (2007) points out that governments have different means to fulfil 
their responsibilities – including that related to the provision of drinking water – and 
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classify these on two dimensions: the level of organizational proliferation and the extent to 
which these organizations are coordinated from a central point.  
They argued that, in the OECD countries, the New Public Management (NPM) 
doctrine has resulted in a disaggregation and a suboptimal fragmentation of government, 
which called for a strengthening of coordination through hierarchical, market-type and 
network-type mechanisms.  
 
Specialization 
Specialization refers to “the creation of new public sector organizations with limited 
objectives and specific tasks out of traditional core departments with many tasks and 
different, sometimes conflicting objectives” (Verhoest et al. 2007: 327). Verhoest et al. 
(ibid.) distinguish horizontal specialization – “the splitting of organizations at the same 
administrative and hierarchical level” – from vertical specialization, e.g.: “the differentiation 
of responsibility on hierarchical levels”. 
Specialization thus refers to a double move. First, specialization introduces a 
decoupling between policy design and policy implementation, with the higher hierarchical 
layer in charge of the former, and the lower one in charge of the latter; a process labelled 
as decentralization, agencification or privatization. Second, the organizations in charge of 
policy implementation tend to become smaller, and entirely oriented toward a single 
policy field.  
 
Coordination 
Coordination refers to “the instruments and mechanisms that aim to enhance the 
voluntary or forces alignment of tasks and efforts of organizations within the public sector. 
These are used in order to create a greater coherence, and to reduce redundancy, 
lacunae and contradictions within and between policies, implementation or management 
(Peters 1998 in Verhoest et al. 2007: 330). 
Three kind coordination mechanisms are distinguished (Bouckaert et al, 2010; 
Verhoest, et al, 2007):  
• Hierarchy-type Mechanisms (HTM), emphasizing top down planning, direct control, 
accountability, and centralization, and usually relying on authority and dominance; 
• Market-type Mechanisms (MTM), relying on competition and performance 
incentives and adopting principles such as competitive tendering and result oriented 
incentive systems; 
• Network-type Mechanisms (NTM), depending on trust and cooperation among 
actors and operating through initiatives such as joint consultation and decision-
making, partnership and information exchange.  
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Evolution 
Crossing the dimensions of specialization and coordination, Verhoest et al. (2007) 
distinguish four models of public sector organization:  
I. High coordination, low specialization: the public sector is composed of a small 
number of huge ministerial departments, in charge of the design and 
implementation of policies of different nature; 
II. High coordination, high specialization: the public sector is composed of many 
organizations competent for the implementation of a specific policy, and there is a 
central point, of administrative or political nature, organizing the division of labour 
and the interactions among these organizations;  
III. Low coordination, low specialization: the huge ministries suffer from internal 
fragmentation and competition among units, and can’t take advantage of their wide 
portfolio to streamline policy design and implementation;  
IV. Low coordination, high specialization: many single-purpose agencies are in charge 
of policy implementation, and there wide autonomy leads to redundancy, 
incoherence and competition. 
 
 
F igure 1 – OECD patterns of evolut ions on special izat ion and coordinat ion (Verhoest 
et a l .  2007) 
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Verhoest et al. (2007) observe that, despite local variations, the public sector of 
OECD countries has generally evolved through three stages: 
1. Bureaucracy: policy design and implementation are entrusted to the same ministry, 
which is generally in charge of several policy fields; HTM ensures coordination;  
2. New Public Management (NPM): the poor performance of bureaucracies led to 
disjoin policy fields are disjoined, and to decouple policy design from policy 
implementation, so that there is one organization for each purpose, enjoying the 
level of autonomy it needs to deliver high quality products.  
3. Whole-of-government approaches. The single-purpose agencies of the NPM 
became mavericks in the system: unaccountable, uncontrollable and incapable of 
dealing with cross-organizational issues. Instead of decreasing specialization and 
rebuild bureaucracies, OECD countries tried to regain control over the whole system 
through MTM or NTM coordination mechanisms, lowering the autonomy of 
implementation-oriented agencies.  
 
Methodology 
Data were obtained from government documents and academic sources. Data were 
obtained from government documents as well as academic sources. Data from these 
sources were gathered through web searching and targeted request from federal 
government, i.e. from MoWIE.  
 
Specialization and coordination 
Specifically we reviewed literature on NPM and DDS, analysed water legal 
frameworks and plans. 
In particular the drinking water legal frameworks, water sector plans such as Water 
Sector Development Plan (WSDP), and Universal Access Plan (UAP), Economic 
Development Plans, i.e. Agricultural Development Led-Industrialization (ADLI), Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP), Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) and GTP. 
Drinking water legal frameworks and plans were analysed qualitatively, and 
academic literature on NPM and DS were reviewed 
 
Access rates 
For the period 2000-2015, aggregated figures regarding access to drinking water at 
national level were available. This allowed examining whether or not the policy shift of 
2005 has had a positive impact on access rates.  
However, data at regional level were only available for the period 2005-2014. This 
does not allow specifying the before-after comparison performed at national level. This is 
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an important limitation of this study. This second dataset distinguishes access to drinking 
water in 11 Ethiopian regions, with a further distinction between urban and rural areas in 
each. This allowed comparing the difference in access to drinking water between regions 
and between urban and rural areas. Therefore, we relied on two methods.  
 
To identify weather there exist access inequality between regions and urban- urban and 
rural-rural residences between regions one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) at 0.05 
significance level was used. One- way ANOVA was used because there were 12 
independent observations and only one dependent variable (access).  Furthermore, we 
assumed the variance between independent group is homogenous (equal) and 
importantly we used population data, not a sample, thus assumption in ANOVA that  
populations from which the samples were taken are normally distributed is not the 
concern at all (Davis, 2008; Kothari, 2004). 
 
The 0.05 confidence interval was used for the fact that it is commonly used to measure 
mean difference between more than two independent groups in social science (Davis, 
2008; Kothari, 2004). A 0.05 confidence level implies in 100 trials 95 % results holds true; 
there were only a 5 % potential error due to chance.  Normally we took the value of 
degree of freedom (Df) and the corresponding value for Sig, and compared the Sig value 
with the confidence interval (Davis, 2008; Kothari, 2004). The Sig value also called p-value 
and shows probability value of the group analysed within fixed boundary as per 
confidence interval (0.05, in this study), meaning when p-value is < 0.05 there is significant 
difference between groups or the value lies out of the expected boundary. In our case we 
inherently hypothesized that there is no significant access difference between regions and 
between residence categories at 0.05 confidence level. Thus we rejected the hypothesis 
when P value is < 0.05.  
Moreover, because ANOVA only tells weather there exists overall mean difference 
or not  between independent groups, to further discern  those  that account for mean 
difference between groups, to test for differences between  groups,  we performed 
Analysis of Post- Hoc comparison at 0.05 confidence level (Davis, 2008) using LSD equal 
variance assumed approach. In this paper we only reported the result of Post- hoc 
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comparison, the result of multiple comparisons in a table in the column labelled mean 
difference (I  – J) ,  which have value attended by asterisks, meaning access between 
groups differ significantly from each other at the 0.05 level of significance (Davis, 2008). 
SPSS version 20 software was used to compute ANOVA and Post- Hoc comparison 
 
 
Special ization and coordination of the Ethiopian water sector 
 
1991-2005: Specialization 
Federalization 
The Transitional government of Ethiopia appears had changed politico-
administrative landscape of Ethiopia. The first decentralization wave began under the 
transitional government.  Transitional Charter (No.1 /1991) provided the legal framework 
for devolving state power (Tewfik, 2010). This was considered as the first attempt to 
address the longstanding question of self-administration and to build legitimacy by 
delivering services by the incoming government (Peterson, 2015).  
In consequence the responsibility for drinking water supply was moved from central 
government to regional governments. At central government, the Ministry of Natural 
Resources Development and Environmental Protection was responsible for the planning, 
management, and coordination (Procl. No.41/1993). However, regions were forced to 
follow the footsteps of the centre, they cascaded Agriculture Development Led 
Industrialization (ADLI). 
 
Structural adjustment 
First from the 1991-1996 the country introduced the Structural Adjustment Program 
(1991–1996). The principal focus under Structural Adjustment Programme was to realign 
institutions inherited from past regimes to fit with newly envisaged politico- administrative 
system.  
During this period the country introduced Structural Adjustment Programme and 
adopted a neoliberal variant economic policy (Adejumobi, 2007). Private sectors were 
involved in water sector development (Proc. No. 92/1994) while NGOs were engage in 
governance and development activities.  
 
New Public Management  
From 1996 to 2005, the country officially embraced the New Public Management 
(NPM) doctrine (Getachew & Common, 2007).  
The theoretical basis of NPM is largely rooted in public choice theory and influenced 
by neoliberal economic doctrine. The neoliberals regard the public sector operating under 
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the Keynesian welfare state model as wasteful; inefficient and ineffective (African 
Development Bank, 2005; Leftwich, 2000), and hence argue for a market approach to 
improve public sector performance (Pollitt, 2007; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011).  
NPM is commonly characterized by greater effort to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness, structural devolution and disaggregation, flexibility and empowerment, 
result-based accountability (output and outcome), and professionalism in public service 
delivery (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007, Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Pollitt, 2007; Bouckaert 
& Halligan, 2008). 
The NPM approach to manage drinking water supply is a widespread reform 
program in developing countries since 1970s (Furlong, 2012; Mukokoma & van Dijk, 
2013). However, there are still theoretical and empirical debates on the effect of NPM on 
drinking water supply in developing countries (Mukokoma and van Dijk, 2013). 
Notwithstanding the relevance of some elements of NPM, it should be stressed that the 
market approach to drinking water supply may not work well in the context of Africa in 
particular, partly because of an underdeveloped market, partly because of increasing 
inequality and unequal power relations, and also because of historically clientelistic 
tendencies of African states (African Development Bank, 2005).  
In Ethiopia, under the NPM motto, responsibilities for drinking water were 
decentralized to local governments, and many local and international NGOs were 
involved. Multiple stakeholders and many institutions such as government institutions 
(federal, regional and local), private sector, donors, many local and international NGOs, 
and the local community were directly or indirectly involved in drinking water supply 
(MoFED, 2004). Furthermore, under this motto, responsibilities for drinking water were 
decentralized to local governments.  This led to a whole constellation of loosely 
coordinated actors. 
 Overall regions and local governments were implementing bodies (MoWR, 2002) 
and federal government had significant supervisory power over regions (UN-DESA & 
MoWE, 2011). 
 
Federal: horizontal specialization 
In 1995, the water sector obtained a own ministry, the Ministry of Water Resources 
(MoWR). MoWR was responsible for formulating water policies and strategies, and 
coordinating and monitoring water sector development and service at federal level 
(MOFED, 2004:13). The ministry was also responsible for channelling donor funds in the 
sector to local governments and was mandated to issue water use permit and studies 
water tariff (Proclamation No. 4/1995). The Ministry developed many legal frameworks 
and plans for water supply, which were subsequently adopted by regional and local 
governments. 
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Furthermore, the federal government established six other institutions to enhance 
water resource utilization (UN-WATER/WWAP, 2006)3. Other ministries, including the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), the Ministry of Health (MOH) 
and Ministry of Education (MOE) were also involved in water service supply, often on a 
disconnected manner. 
 
 
Regions: vertical specialization 
Regions were responsible for the overall planning, coordination and administration 
of drinking supply of their jurisdiction, in accordance with federal institutional legal 
frameworks and plans. They were also responsible to provide technical assistance to local 
government (MoFED, 2004, UAP, 2006). Alike the federal level, many institutions were also 
involved in drinking water supply4.  
 
Zones: vertical specialization 
Through several zonal level institutions5, zones were responsible for designing rural 
water supply schemes, repairing and maintaining water machinery for both urban and 
rural centers, providing technical and managerial support to local institutions, and 
managing and supporting multi-district water supply schemes (UN-DESA & MoWE, 2011).  
 
Local Governments 
In the early 2000s, a second wave of decentralization occurred (World Bank, 2013), 
transferring the responsibility for drinking water supply to local governments.. Local 
governments were made responsible for drinking water supply (MoWR, 2006, MoFED, 
2004). Similar to the other levels of government, many institutions were engaged in water 
services at local level6.  
In cities/towns, autonomous town water boards were created, reporting to local 
government administrative councils. In rural areas and small towns, District Water Desks 
                                            
3 Water Works Subsidiary Organizations; Water Works Design and Supervision Enterprise (WWDSE), 
Ethiopian Water Works Construction Enterprise (EWWCE), Water Well Drilling Enterprise (WWDDE), Awash 
Basin Water Resources Management Authority, and Water resource development fund (WRDF) 
4 The regional level institutions include: the Agriculture and Rural Development Bureau, the Finance 
and Economic Development Bureau, the Health Bureau, the Education Bureau the Water Works 
Construction Enterprises 
5 such as Zonal Finance and Economic Development office, Zonal Health office and Zonal Education 
office (UN-WATER/WWAP, 2006/7) 
6 The most relevant institutions include District Agriculture and Rural Development offices, District 
Finance and Economic Development office, District Health office, District Education office, Regional water 
works subsidiary Organizations (engaged in water utility construction),  relevant Zonal institutions such as 
Zonal Finance and economic development office Zonal Health office and Zonal Education office, 
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(DWD) were responsible for drinking water supply, including the operation and 
maintenance of water supply systems (UN-DESA & MoWE, 2011; MoWE, 2013). Both 
urban and rural local governments adopted plans issued by regional governments and 
followed general policy frameworks but could take into account local contexts. For 
instance, the urban water boards were authorized to implement contingent water tariff 
structure and contract out operation and maintenance services and sell or dispose 
enterprise assets (UN-DESA & MoWE, 2011). 
 
Private sector and NGOs 
Many Donors and NGOs, private sectors were engaged in water service supply often 
in disconnected manner. 
NGOs were engaged in sector development, community mobilization and policy 
advocacy and private sectors were participated in water utility construction and 
maintenance). 
The role of NGOs, however, was relatively significant; they were involved in right-
based policy advocacy. 
 
Coordination mechanisms  
The HTM were dominant, but there were also elements of quasi MTM (contract) and 
NTM. Coordination instruments include top down policy design, top down planning 
system (e.g. water sector development plans) and structural instrument (reshuffling 
competencies) and communications and ordinary contract administration. 
 
 
2005-2014: Coordination 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 2005 elections, government adopted the DDS doctrine along 
the lines of successfully industrializing countries of East Asia; i.e. China and South Korea 
(UN Habitat, 2014, World Bank, 2013) to ensure socio-economic transformation. The 
sentiment towards DS, however, was voiced in the aftermath of the 1990s. There were 
major changes in terms of institutional arrangements and power relations. The Growth 
and Transformation plan (GTP) the government further confirms its commitment to the 
DDS doctrine (MOFED, 2010).  
Many initiatives were taken at federal, regional and local government levels to enhance 
vertical and horizontal coordination, to meet GTP/UAP targets and to enforce DDS 
doctrine without significantly changing water sector legal frameworks.. Furthermore, there 
were no changes in the number and type of stakeholders that were engaged in drinking 
water supply at all levels of government.  
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Developmental State Doctrine 
Joshi (2012) opined that DS “is particularly well suited to enable the transformation 
of a poor, underdeveloped society into a prosperous one” (Joshi, 2012:355).  
The concept and practice of DS exist in many sources although not explicitly stated 
(Leftwich, 2000: 157). Japan is considered the first DS case, referring back to the 
undemocratic period of the Meiji era (Bolesta in Bekele & Regassa, 2012). Scholars trace 
back the concept to the 20th century, but agree that the concept is well developed in 
1980s following the seminal work of Chalmers Johnson’s (Bekele & Regassa, 2012) and 
successful development experiences of East Asian countries (Leftwich, 2000, Turner et al, 
2013, Bekele & Regassa, 2012). In the context of Africa it is increasingly used since the 21st 
century (Bekele & Regassa, 2012; Edigheje, 2010). 
According to Zenewi (2006), DS is different from liberal, weak and 
predatory/exploitive states. He describes DS as a strong state that is committed to state-
lead macro-economic planning, being relatively insulated from internal and external 
pressure (autonomous/independent), with absolute interventionist mentality (different 
from other types of interventionist states) not only to regulate, guide, and shape, but also 
to monitor and control the economy to maximize the interest of society through 
undermining socially wasteful rent-seeking activities and patronage networks, and 
promotion of fairness and social equity.  
Overall DS can be characterized as a state dedicated to development and 
legitimized by development results (Bekele & Regassa, 2012). Leftwich (2000: 380) notes 
the distinguishing characteristics of DS is “their institutional structures and 
developmentally driven political objective.” Among others, Leftwich, characterizes DS as 
(1) one party rule for over 30 years, whether the state is democratic or not, (2) state 
dominated by a dedicated and relatively incorruptible elite, (3) such elite having significant 
relative autonomy over other forces, (4) and capable of insulating the state from external 
influence, and (5) a state that puts restrictions on mass media and civil societies to weaken 
pressure from within.   
The Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA, 2011) promotes the DS doctrine, in 
its democratic variant. It particularly recommends the Malaysian DS approach, a model 
taking a middle position between the neo-liberal open economy and a centrally-planned 
system.  
 
 
Vertical and horizontal coordination: WASH 
In this framework, government focused on strengthening both vertical and 
horizontal coordination notably through the introduction of an overall framework – Water 
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Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) – for procurement, management and reporting with 
which all players have to comply.  
 Relying on the 2005 Paris declaration which emphasizes vertical and horizontal 
coordination among all actors at levels to implement WASH program (FDRE, 2013; 2014, 
WaterAid, 2013), and the EU WASH program support to catalyse inter-sector integration 
and dialogue on WASH, and to put in place coordination structures across the water, 
health, and education sectors (Water and Sanitation Program, 2011), there has been 
greater interest in harmonization, integration and alignment to supply drinking water. To 
this end among other things, Operational Manual for the Consolidated WASH Account 
(CWA) and WASH Implementation Framework (WIF) were developed, and Memorandum 
of Understandings (MoUs) were signed between all major actors of the field (public, and 
NGO’s), except by private sector, to institutionalize the WASH structure. 
 In general the MoUs signify one system for planning, budgeting, financial 
management and procurement, information, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting. 
All partners are expected to “report their progress and budget utilization to the relevant 
WASH coordinating body at their respective levels” (FDRE, 2014: 16). 
The organizational arrangement for WASH implementation was flexible and run 
from federal to local government (FDRE, 2013; MoWE, 2011). However, the deeper 
perspective shows the WASH structure emphasize strong connection between federal 
government and local governments and community. This is because the WASH structure 
at national, district and community levels were mandatory and WASH funds that were 
deposited in a single Consolidated Wash Account (CWA), opened by MoFED, follow 
through these structures. Governments were expected to allocate matching funds and 
facilitate participation of other actors in joint efforts, such as meeting and workshops 
(FDRE, 2014). International donors were expected to deposit funds to the CWA (MoWE, 
2011, FDER, 2013) and donors such as AFDB, DFID, UNICEF and WB have started to 
deposit contributions to the CWA (FDER, 2014).  
 
 At the federal level, the line ministry was restructured twice, ultimately becoming 
the Ministry of Water Resource Irrigation and Energy (MoWIE; Proclamation n° 691/2010, 
Proclamation N° 803/2013). New institutional arrangement further increased the mandate 
of the ministry. A WASH steering committee was established, composed of 
representatives of MOFED, MoWIE, MOH, MOE, international donors and NGOs (MoWE, 
2013). Furthermore, there was WASH coordination office at the MoWEI. Comparable 
structures are presumed to exist at regional level.  
At local level, WASH committees were established, encompassing all relevant 
stakeholders: public (development, water, education, agriculture and women’s affairs), and 
non-profit actors. These actors were responsible for the management of WASH programs. 
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Three levels (district, village and community) were distinguished, the lower level reporting 
to the higher one (WaterAid, 2013; MoWE, 2011).  
The WASH structures in general not only streamline relevant institutions to supply 
drinking water but also created a command and control chain linking the federal 
government to the grass root level. In other words the federal government not only used 
local decentralization to enhance drinking water supply and its legitimacy but also to 
reduce regional power and connect federal state machinery with society to control 
citizens at grass root level (Snyder et al 2014; Peterson, 2015). 
 
Recentralization 
Although local governments remain responsible to supply drinking water efficiently 
and effectively, (MoWR, 2006, MoWE, 2013) in some regions, the authority of local 
government council over urban water boards and DWDs was over taken by regional 
water bureaus and zonal water offices respectively. In Oromia National Regional State for 
instance, the local water agencies of the largest cities  were made accountable to the 
regions and zones instead of local government administrative councils (Pro. No.97/2005; 
see also MoWE, 2013). Instead, local governments were expected to coordinated NGOs 
and private sectors. The implication is that the responsibilities of local governments were 
increased without a substantial increase of authority to supply drinking water. 
 
NGOs 
Although NGOs are partners of the WASH program and as such represented in all 
WASH structures and committees (MoWE, 2011), their position has been seriously 
challenged. In 2005, government lost the elections in urban centres (Leftwich, 2000; 
Lefort, 2012). As a reaction, government has embraced the DS doctrine. In this 
framework, it issued new Charities and Societies Proclamation (Proc.No.621/2009) 
significantly limiting the leeway of NGOs active in Ethiopia.  Those NGOs which obtain 
more than 10 % of their fund from external sources were prohibited from engaging in 
rights-based policy advocacy. Local NGOs were particularly weakened, on grounds of 
national security imperatives, the need to avoid further dependence on donor funding, 
and to ensure accountability of NGOs towards people rather than external agents.  
Moreover, although they were not obliged to deposit financial contributions to 
CWA, they were forced to integrate, align, and harmonize their activities with government 
programs and policies and work in partnership with government at all levels and report 
their financial contribution to WASH (MoWE, 2011; WaterAid, 2013).  
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Private sector 
The private sector has never been strong in Ethiopia, partly because of socialist 
economic policies until 1990. In the outset the private companies are at an early stage of 
development and have low capacity (WaterAid, 2013). Like the non-profit sector, the 
involvement of private sector institutions has been severely limited after the 2005 
elections. Although formally involved, like the NGOs, in the WASH structures, they were 
not allowed directly participating to the decision-making process.  
 
Conclusion 
The forgoing discussions shows government has systematically disciplined NGOs 
and private sector to consolidate its power in view of strong DDS doctrine, suggesting    
the state enterprises will continue to dominate water work construction and drinking 
water supply.  
Generally since 2005 there has been strong interest to strengthen both vertical and 
horizontal coordination of drinking water supply. However, it appears that vertical 
coordination was more strengthened than horizontal coordination. HTM was further 
strengthened, although there were elements of MTM and NTM. There were tendencies 
towards systematic recentralization of authority but further decentralization of 
responsibilities for drinking water supply using top down management instruments (plans, 
and financial management) and structural instruments (reshuffling competencies, 
committee structures)  than  systems of information exchange and collective decision. 
Noteworthy is that the synergy among actors was not developed well.  This partly 
explained by the under developed drinking water supply Management Information 
System, lack of water sector monitoring frameworks and data base until 2011, and 
multiplicity of  institutions involved (UN-DESA & MoWE, 2011), inadequate institutional 
capacity at all levels  and lack of mutual trust mong actor at all levels.  
 
2016-: what’s next?  
As mentioned earlier in the aftermath of 2005 national election, the current 
government of Ethiopia has strongly determined to recentralize authority on one hand 
decentralization of responsibility for public service to local governments on the other. 
Recentralization is primarily stimulated because: the ruling party had lost vote in urban 
centres including in many rural areas where the party seemingly confident to get vote, the 
deep-rooted top-down political culture and Marxist-Leninist oriented ruling party leaders 
since the time of armed struggle against Dergue regime (Peterson, 2015; Di Nunzio, 
2014). The federal government has used two major tactics; the endorsement of DDS 
doctrine and  thereby to systematic control every sector and including citizens at grass 
root level using both formal and informal institutions and decentralization of public 
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service responsibility to local government as an instrument to connect federal state-local 
government-society (Snyder et al 2014; Peterson, 2015).   
Noteworthy is that many questions remain unanswered in spite of officially 
pronounced economic growth.  Five warranty attention.  There has been little progress in 
terms of socio-economic transformation. Second, it is unclear whether required 
institutional capacity and arrangements are in place to presume DDS doctrine in spite of 
continuous capacity building programs (Bekele & Regassa 2012).  Third, there are 
potential risks of political instability because of “opposition and anti-government groups” 
(GRIPS, 2009:116). Fourth, because of country’s traditional hierarchical and autocratic 
political culture and clientelism, the practice of decentralized governance has not 
emerged (Hagmann & Abbink, 2011; Paulos, 2007; Tobias & Jon, 2011). Fifth, there are 
also concerns whether the constitution foresees DDS doctrine (Bekele & Regassa, 2012). 
Thus these open questions may jeopardize the essence of sustainable development and 
governance in general and drinking water supply in particular. 
 
Conclusion 
Verhoest et al. (2007) had observed that OCED countries had evolved toward a 
greater specialization of their public sector first, which led to coordination problems 
addressed by attempts at regaining overall control over the constellation of institutions.  
In this section, we observed that the Ethiopian water sector has followed a 
comparable pattern. From 1991, Ethiopia engaged in a federalization process: many new 
actors emerged at each new government level, with the lower one in charge of 
implementing the policies designed at a higher level. Also, many private and non-profit 
actors became involved. By 2005, the Ethiopian water sector was highly specialized.  
The trigger to invest in coordination mechanisms were not so much actual 
performance problems than an overall will to tighten control over the Ethiopian society 
after the 2005 elections. The net result was however comparable to the one achieve in 
OECD countries: a limited decrease in organizational proliferation, and a significant 
increase in the overall level of control over the water system – probably more significant 
than in OECD countries.   
 
Evolutions in access to drinking water 
 
National Access to Drinking Water: Before and After Developmental State Doctrine 
Notwithstanding the inconsistency in performance data, official performance reports 
shows national access to drinking water has improved continually but not linearly since 
DDS doctrine was endorsed. Figure 1 shows the national access to drinking water trend 
since 2000. 
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F igure 2 – National access to dr inking water (2000-2014, %)7  
 
Figure 1 indicates that national performance has improved from 30,8 % in 2000 to 
76,72% in 2014. From 2000 to 2005, this improvement has been modest, from 30,8% to 
36,7%, relatively to the 2005-2014 period where access rates rose up to 76,72%. Access 
rates surprisingly dropped in 2011, from 68,5% to 52,12%, before shifting to a positive 
trend again (UN Habitat, 2014). 
                                            
7 Sources: 2000-2004 (MoFED 2004), 2001 (WSDP 2002), 2002 (UN-Habitat 2014), 2005-2014 
(MoWR et al. 2014) 
30,8	 30,9	 34	 33,7	
36,7	
45,59	47,3	
52,46	
59,3	
66,2	 68,5	
52,12	
58,25	
68,45	
76,72	
0	
10	
20	
30	
40	
50	
60	
70	
80	
90	
2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	
Ac
ce
ss
	to
	d
rin
ki
ng
	w
at
er
	(%
	
po
pu
la
5o
n)
	
Year	
  17 
 
 
Figure 3 – Access to dr inking water per region (2005-2014, % populat ion) 
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Access to Drinking Water by Regions 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of access rates region per region, for the period 
2005-2014.  
It indicates, first, a significant initial inequality among Ethiopian regions, with 
access rates varying from 9,4% in Somali to 93% in the capital, Addis Ababa.  
Over the period 2005-2014, this inequality has been significantly reduced. In 
2014, Afar has the lowest access rate (51,71%), and Harari the highest (96,46%).  
Figure 3 moreover allows stating that the surprising drop in national access 
observed in 2011 is mainly due to the Amhara, Benishanguel Gumze, Afar and 
SNNP regions and, to a lower extent, the Oromia, Tigray and Addis Ababa regions. 
The regions of Somali, Gambella, Dire Dawa and Harari were spared.  
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) has been performed on this data set. 
The ANOVA results on Table 1 indicate that access to drinking water differ 
significantly between regions (F (11, 119) =5.732, P<0.05):  
 
Access  Comparison  Sum of Squares Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Region – 
Region 
Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
16319.423 
27953.707 
44273.130 
11 
108 
119 
1483.584 
258.831 
5.732 .000 
Table 1 – ANOVA Results for dif ferences between regions 
 
A one-way Post-Hoc comparison shows the difference is primarily because of 
divergent significant access difference between many regions (see annex 2). Note 
that significant access difference was not observed between Tigray, Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNP, Harari and Benishanguel Gumze regions. On the other hand, access 
to drinking water in Addis Ababa was significantly different from all regions except 
Dire Dawa City Administration. 
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Urban versus rural access  
Figure 4 shows the evolution in access rates in urban and rural areas of 
Ethiopia, aggregated at national level. 
 
F igure 4 – Evolut ion of access rates,  urban versus rural (2005-2014, % of 
populat ion) 
 
As it can be seen from figure 4, in 2005 urban centres (82%) were far better off 
than rural areas (38,66%) in terms of access to drinking water. By 2014, this gap had 
significantly decreased. This is mainly due to an impressive growth in rural areas 
(95,2%, from 38,66% to 75,48%); the access rate in cities having not significantly 
progressed (2,7%, from 82% to 84,21%; cf. annex 1).  
Table 2 reports the ANOVA-results. These indicate that there were significant 
inequalities between regions both in urban (F (11, 12) =2.109, P<0.05) and rural (F 
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areas in Somali differs significantly from all regions, and Afar from Dire Dawa (see 
annex 2). It also indicates that access in urban centres in Tigray and Afar were 
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significantly different from Addis Ababa; Amhara and Oromia from Somali and 
Harari; and Harari from Amhara, Oromia and Addis Ababa. Compared to all regions 
and national urban average, access to drinking water in urban areas in Benishanguel 
Gumze, SNNP, Gambella, and Dire Dawa regions was not significantly different from 
all regions. There was also no significant difference between Addis Ababa and Dire 
Dawa. With regard to access growth rate in urban areas, Somali had an increase of 
211.8% followed by Harari (180.7) and Dire Dawa (41.1%). A decline of 27.1%, 14.2 
% and 5.7% in growth rate was obtained for Benishanguel Gumze, Amhara and 
Addis Ababa. It should be noted that the increase in growth rate in Harari was 
attributed to low access in 2005 because of the dry up of Haramaya Lake (raw water 
source) and change of raw water source in 2010. Nevertheless, the trend shows 
rural–rural, and urban-urban inequalities between regions and within regions have 
reduced overtime. From the analysis it follows that inequality is reduced partly 
because of an increase in growth rate in rural areas and a decline in growth rate in 
urban centres in some regions. 
 
Access  Comparison  Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Rural- 
Rural 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
6749.170 
30274.483 
37023.653 
10 
99 
109 
674.917 
305.803 
2.207 .023 
Urban –
urban 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
6280.716 
29786.470 
36067.186 
11 
110 
121 
570.974 
270.786 
2.109 .025 
Table 2 – ANOVA Results Rural-Rural versus Urban-urban rural access rates 
 
Discussion 
Examining the evolutions in specialisation and coordination of the water supply 
sector in Ethiopia, we observed that it followed a comparable pattern as OECD 
countries. In first instance, many specialized organizations emerged. Following the 
2005 election and the proclamation of DS doctrine, significant efforts were 
undertaken to coordinate this system of actors.  
Analysing the evolutions in access rates to drinking water, we noticed an 
overall impressive progression at national level temporarily interrupted in 2011, a 
significant reduction in inequality among regions, and rural areas progressively 
closing the gap separating them from access rates enjoyed in cities.  
In this section, we examine whether these improvements in access rates can be 
attributed to the coordination efforts undertaken since 2005. We develop three 
hypotheses for this increase in performance.  
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Coordination has improved access 
According to the first hypothesis, the coordination efforts undertaken since 
2005 have been fruitful.  
The period 1991-2005 had witnessed a significant increase in specialization. 
Vertically, the federalization process led to distinguish many layers of government 
(national, regional, zonal and local). In the water sector, a decoupling was hereby 
introduced between policy design, resorting to the national level, and policy 
implementation for which local governments were made responsible; the layers in 
between fulfilling support and limited coordination functions. Horizontally, in this 
period characterized by Structural Adjustment Programmes and NPM reforms, many 
private and non-profit actors sponsored by international donors became involved in 
the supply of drinking water. During this period, access rate rose from 30,8% to 
36,7%, a progression of about 19%. All other things remaining equal, this suggests 
that specialization was generally positive, probably through a process by which 
many vacant positions in the water supply system became occupied by various 
institutional players.  
After the 2005 elections, government undertook to significantly strengthen its 
control over the Ethiopian society. In the water sector, this coordination effort was 
realized through the introduction of an overall framework for procurement, 
management, financing, reporting on water policy. All actors involved in the water 
supply sector were bound to the objectives, means and network-type decision-
making structures. Their autonomy was significantly limited. Also, a limited decrease 
in specialization occurred, with regional governments taking over, in some places, 
the responsibilities devoted to the local governments. Figure 1 shows the spectacular 
improvement in access rates that followed the introduction of this framework: from 
36,7% in 2005 to 76,72% in 2014, a progression rate of about 110%. Figure 2 and 3 
further indicate that a catching up process occurred, with disadvantaged regions 
and rural areas progressively approaching the access levels enjoyed in better off 
regions and in cities. All other things remaining equal, this suggests that 
coordination efforts were fruitful overall, especially in rural areas and disadvantaged 
regions.  
As such, these findings corroborate the public administration literature in the 
OECD countries which attributes positive effects of NPM-led specialization and 
Joined-up-governments’ attempts at increasing coordination (Bouckaert et al. 2010; 
Verhoest et al. 2007). However, this research has not allowed identifying the 
empirical mechanisms through which specialization and coordination would have 
resulted in improved access rates in Ethiopia in 1995-2014. Although plausible, this 
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hypothesis cannot thus be confirmed on basis of this study only. Therefore, other 
hypotheses deserve examination. 
 
Unreliability of performance information 
The data we relied upon has been compiled principally from official Ethiopian 
sources. For sure, UN data was relied upon too, but this data has its origins in official 
figures too. As such, this compilation is an added-value of this paper, since no 
longitudinal datasets were publicly available as to the access rates of each regions in 
urban and rural areas. An initiative to develop a national database for drinking water 
supply has recently been undertaken (UN-DESA & MoWE, 2011).  
The trustworthiness of official performance reports can however be questioned 
on several grounds.  
First, the fact that no data as to regional, urban and rural access rates before 
2005 indicates that there was disconnection between federal and regional 
governments, the practice of performance measurement and performance 
information incorporation are relatively new in Ethiopia, and thus it is reasonable to 
expect that Ethiopian authorities had to climb a learning curve that is considered 
steep by several commentators.  
Second, the sudden drop in performance noticed in 2011, which followed a 
National Water Supply and Sanitation Service Inventory were conducted in 2011 
(MoWIE, 2014) could indicate that figures were suddenly brought into closer 
alignment with reality.  
Third, the performance targets were regularly adapted during the period 
under consideration, in various national plans for water supply. Less ambitious 
indicators could have as mechanical effect to improve performance figures. Further 
analysis onto the variation of performance indicators is obviously required. 
Finally, a developmental state earns its legitimacy from the development 
results. Thus, a  country embracing this doctrine has a natural incentive to produce 
optimistic performance figures.  
 
Environmental causes  
Finally, these performance figures can be attributed to many environmental 
factors, including variation in water resources and climatic condition.  
Concerning water sources and climatic condition, for example, Gambella has 
relatively many water resources and has a wet climatic condition while Tigray region 
has semi-arid climate and relatively few water resources (MoWE, 2013).  
Seasonal water source variation and climatic change, as well as human 
activities, may also contribute. A case in point was Harari Regional State whose 
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access performance decreased (2005-2010) because of the drying up of a raw water 
source, i.e. Haramya Lake. 
 
Conclusions and Policy implications 
This study has examined drinking water supply coordination mechanisms in the 
post 1990s Ethiopia and its effect on access to drinking water. Based on the 
evidences the following conclusions and policy implications are made. 
 Since 1991 drinking water supply was decentralized in two waves. In the first 
wave (1991-2000s) responsibility for drinking water supply was entrusted to regional 
governments and in the second wave (since 2000s) the competence for drinking 
water supply has been relocated to local governments. Many fundamental drinking 
water legal frameworks and strategies were issued between 1995 and 2005. These 
legal frameworks and strategies remain unchanged fundamentally. All legal 
documents and plans were rural biased and give priority for drinking water over 
other uses and containing components of NPM and DDS doctrine. Elements of NPM 
include efficiency, financial sustainability, commercializing water service by applying 
“user pay principle” and performance-based financing (World Bank, 2013, 
Proc.268/2002) and the involvement of private sector was accepted. The DDS 
perspective on the other hand, regards government is responsible for addressing 
spatial disparities and historically entrenched socio-economic structural inequalities 
in drinking water supply. Importantly, it should be noted that the two policy options 
were in trade-offs and perhaps the trade-offs will continue to arise. Because  even 
the urban centres were not able to recover costs (Banerjee et al, 2008) and 
community standpipe users in towns/cities, often the poor and disadvantaged, pay 
higher prices for water than private users (MoWE, 2013). Balancing both objectives 
remains difficult and the trade-off seems to continue. Overall, federal government 
was responsible for policy design, regional governments for policy administration 
and local governments for drinking water supply. This led to a decoupling between 
policy design and policy implementation. 
 Following the 2005 national election, in general, there was a double trend 
towards greater harmonization, integration and systematic recentralization of 
authority on the one hand, and further decentralization of responsibilities for 
drinking water supply on the other. The MoUs, the  introduction of Consolidated 
WASH Account and WASH structures at all government levels, the ratification of new 
Charities and Societies proclamation (Proc. N° 621/2009) and the systematic 
dismissal of local government’s council authority over urban water boards and 
DWDs are indicators thereof. Furthermore, private sector and NGO/CSO 
participation have been systematically weakened. Although, many have questioned 
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whether Ethiopia has basic features of DDS (Bekele & Regassa, 2012), certainly these 
are some traits of a DS doctrine (Leftwich, 1994). Therefore the post 2005 drinking 
water coordination approach, although has comparable net effect, is certainly 
different from the ongoing approaches to strengthen vertical and horizontal 
coordination in OECD countries. Change in power relations was mediated by both 
internal factors (politics of the day) and external factors (pressure from NGOs and 
foreseen pressure from private sector). 
The harmonization initiatives have not improved the coupling between policy 
and management cycles and challenges of coordination may continue to rise. The 
decoupling is attributed to inadequate monitoring and evaluation, multiplicity of 
institutions that involved in drinking water supply, absence of a proper database and 
information exchange  system,  coordination challenges, insufficient institutional 
capacity and instability, inadequate public-private and government-NGO/CSO 
partnerships (UN-WATER/WWAP, 2006), and historically entrenched authoritarian 
political culture. Furthermore, administrative requirements of federal and regional 
institutions may challenge coordination capacity of local government and obstruct 
them from providing drinking water services to citizens and concentrate on 
administrative jobs, such as reporting. The challenges of coordination may also 
escalates due to administrative requirements by donors, a heavy demand for 
information, to avoid critique back home (Chambers, 2005: 32-34) and if official, 
practical and nonofficial norms are not compatible. It is also worth noting that 
synergistic interaction between and among actors takes a long time, but the 
continued direct top down approach may contribute to unwarranted delay.  
Notwithstanding the question of credibility of official reports, non-achievement 
of the targets in SDPRP, PASDEP, may also that of GTP, the study showed overall 
access to drinking water has improved with a sudden drop in 2011; interregional 
inequality have narrowed overtime but the difference remains significant; rural-rural; 
and  urban-urban gap has narrowed down though remain significantly different. On 
surface, it seems in underdeveloped markets such as in Ethiopia, a mix of NPM 
elements and DDS doctrine may help to reduce inequalities to drinking water.  
Nevertheless, cautions are needed. First, there are fluctuations in performance 
reports even since the DDS doctrine was introduced. Second, the study used 
aggregate access data and unable to show socio-economic based horizontal 
interregional inequalities between and within regions and vertical inequalities within 
populations and groups. That would have been possible only if socio-economic 
disaggregated data have been used. Third, there are major concerns about how to 
balance equity and efficiency given limited roles by the private sector and restrictive 
policy frameworks for NGOs (Gudina, 2009), and limited resource capacity of 
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government at all levels and unpredictability of donor fund (WaterAid, 2013). The 
other concern is about how to strengthen the capacity of actors to improve 
performance than who should play the critical role. This requires political decision. 
The implication, however, is that whether historically entrenched top-down political 
culture and the top down approach ensures sustainable drinking water supply 
remains an open question.  But it is clear that unless otherwise this positon is 
equilibrated by other actors from the bottom, such top-down planning and 
restrictive policy frameworks for NGOs could significantly constrain opportunity for 
co-production of drinking water and erodes the legitimacy of government.  
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Annex 1. Access to drinking water by regions and residence since 2005     
Region                          Population access (%)  After democratic DS ideology         Average Growth Rate 
(%) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Tigray Region 40.4 44.3 52.8 59.1 79.4 64 55.4 61.2 73.36 82.18 61.2 103.4 
Urban 64 50.9 60 72 76.8 85.3 68.69 72.05 70.19 75.39 69.5 17.8 
Rural 35 42.8 51.15 56 80 58.8 52.27 58.64 74.09 83.77 59.2 139.3 
Afar  Region 17.3 44 52.98 55.4 61 69.5 38.02 40.32 44.73 51.71 47.5 198.9 
Urban 41.1 73 73 77.4 77.7 86 82.22 80.68 79.19 82 75.2 99.5 
Rural 14.9 41.1 51 53.1 58.4 67 34.96 37.53 42.35 48.58 44.9 226 
Amhara Region 42 41.5 48 53.7 63.1 76 53.43 61.83 77.62 85.27 60.2 103 
Urban 97 80 82 87.8 90.1 90 65.95 70.65 72.82 83.25 81.9 -14.2 
Rural 35 36.6 47.45 49 59.3 80 51.95 60.79 78.38 85.51 58.4 144.3 
Oromia Region 47.5 54 50.9 58.3 62.1 68.5 51.82 57.4 67.92 80.13 59.9 68.7 
Urban 75 64.5 66 97.9 94 95.5 74.16 85.12 85.15 86.05 82.3 14.7 
Rural 45 53 58 52 57.6 64.5 49.83 54.94 66.38 79.49 58.1 76.6 
Somali  Region 9.4 28 29.44 37.9 39.5 42.5 41.6 59.2 73.48 79.88  44.1 749.8 
Urban 29.3 60 60 61.6 76.5 76.5 74.56 80.71 89.21 91.37  64.5 211.8 
Rural 5.4 21.5 23.26 32.9 33.5 37 36.11 56.12 70.09 78.01  39.4 1344.6 
Benishanguel  
Gumze  
Region 40.3 48 52.33 49.3 56.3 80.2 59.92 65.84 69.18 71.70  59.3 77.9 
Urban 89.5 66.2 85.56 93.1 84.7 90.1 66.84 69.76 63.77 65.27  77.5 -27.1 
Rural 35 46 48.72 44.3 51.5 81 59.64 65.58 69.39 72.23  57.3 106.4 
SNNP Region 47.5 54 59 63.6 74.3 62 44.29 50.72 55.57 59.01 56.9 24.2 
Urban 75 64.5 66 72.1 74.9 90.9 65.95 75.53 94.36 97 77.6 29.3 
Rural 45 53 58 63 74.2 58.7 42.9 65.68 53.07 56.07  56.9 24.6 
Gambella Region 27.2 40.6 53.71 54.7 51.4 65.7 66.09 73.58 91.85 96.10  62.1 253.3 
Urban 72.2 37 72.9 98.6 71.5 73 80.29 85.71 98  97.57 78.7 35.1 
Rural 16.8 41.4 49.43 43.9 44.6 63.1 63.58 71.44 85.72 95.69  57.6 469.6 
Harari  Region 29.1 24 24.13 32.5 64.7 75.8 84.01 92.57 98 96.46  62.1 231.5 
Urban 34.2 21 21 27.5 72 95 99.99 97.18 98.79  96.01 66.3 180.7 
Rural 20.8 29 29.24 41 56 53 65.11 87.12 97  97 57.5 366.3 
Addis Ababa  Region(City) 93 90.1 94.42 95 95 96 82.22 80.71 94 87.7 90.8 -5.7 
Urban 93 90.1 94.42 95 95 96 82.22 80.71 94 87.7 90.8 -5.7 
Dire Dawa    Region (City) 56.7 68.2 70.21 73 88.2 78.1 83.77 81.27 82.55 87.84  76.9 54.9 
Urban 62 72 72 72 94 79.7 87.57 85.45 83.42 87.49  77.5 41.1 
Rural 41 57 65.07 75.8 75.8 76 75.61 77.06 85.3 88.59  71.7 116.1 
National  National  45.59 47.3 52.46 59.3 66.2 68.5 52.12 58.25 68.45 76.72 59.5 68.3 
Urban 82 78.8 82.02 86.2 88.6 91.5 74.64 78.71 81.31 84.21 82.8 2.7 
Rural 38.66 42.2 46.39 53.9 61.5 65.8 48.85 55.21 66.54 75.48 55.5 95.2 
Source: MoWR/MoWE/MoWIE 
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Annex 2. One way Post-Hoc comparisons Rural-rural ,  urban- urban 
and region-region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region Rural (S ig) Urban (Sig) Regional (S ig) 
Tigray Somali. (013) Addis Ababa (.005) 
Somali(.019), Addis Ababa.(000) Dire 
Dawa(.031) 
Afar Dire Dawa (.001) Addis Ababa (036) 
Gambella(045) Harari (044), Addis Ababa 
(.000) ,Dire Dawa (000) 
Amhara Somali(.017) 
Somali(.017) 
Harari.(035) 
Somali(.027), Addis Ababa(.000) ,Dire 
Dawa(.022) 
Oromia Somali(.019) 
Somali  (.014) 
Harari(.031) 
Somali (.031) ,Addis Ababa(.000), Dire 
Dawa(.019) 
Somali 
Tigray (.013) , Amhara 
(.017),Oromia (.019) Benishanguel 
Gumze (.024) ,SNNP (.027), 
Gambella(.022 ) Harari(.022) Dire 
Dawa (000) , and National.(043) 
Amhara( .017) 
Oromia(.014), Addis 
Ababa (.000) 
)National.(012) 
Tigray(.019), Amhara (.027) ,Oromia (.031) 
,Benishanguel Gumze (.037) ,Gambella 
(.014) Harari.(014) ,Addis Ababa.(000), Dire 
Dawa (.000) ,National.(035) 
Benishanguel 
Gumze 
Somali (.024) NO 
Somali (.037), Addis Ababa.(000) , Dire 
Dawa (.016) 
SNNP Somali (.027) NO Addis Ababa.(000) ,Dire Dawa(006) 
Gambella Somali(.022) NO 
Afar (.045) ,Somali (.014) ,Addis 
Ababa(.000), Dire Dawa (.041) 
Harari Somali.(022) 
 Amhara(.035), 
Oromia (.031) 
,Addis 
Ababa(.001)Nationa
l(.027) 
Afar (.044), Somali (.014), Addis 
Ababa(000) ,Dire Dawa (.041) 
Dire Dawa 
Afar (.001), Somali (.000) 
,National(.040) 
NO 
Tigray (.031) ,Afar(.000) ,Amhara(.022), 
Oromia.(019), Somali(.000),Benishanguel 
Gumze.(016),SNNP(.006),Gambella(.041) 
,Harari (.041), National(.017) 
National Somali (.043), Dire Dawa (.040) 
Somali. (012) , 
Harari (.027) 
Somali (.035), Addis Ababa(000) Dire 
Dawa (.017) 
Addis Ababa 
(urban) 
 
Tigray (.005), 
Afar(.036) , Somali 
(.000) ,Harari (.001),  
Tigray (.000) , Afar (.000) ,Amhara (.000), 
Oromia (.000) Somali (.000) ,Benishanguel 
Gumze (000), SNNP (.000) ,Gambella.(000) 
,Harari.(000) ,National (.000) 
